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Can Franchisee Associations Serve as a
Substitute for Franchisee Protection Laws?
Robert W. Emerson* and Uri Benoliel**
Abstract
The most vital debate in franchise law over the last few decades has
focused on whether state or federal law should protect franchisees from
the potentially opportunistic behavior of franchisors. Several states, such
as California, Massachusetts, and Vermont, are considering the adoption
of laws protecting franchisees against franchisor opportunism. At the
federal level, several franchisee protections laws have been introduced,
but so far all have been rejected.
Franchisor advocates suggest that franchisee protection laws are
superfluous. Deeply ingrained in franchisor advocates' opposition to
such legislation is the belief that independent franchisee associations,
namely trade associations formed by franchisees within a single
franchise chain, serve as a sufficient barrier against franchisor
opportunism. More specifically, franchisor advocates assume that by
collectivizing a large percentage of the franchisees in the franchise
system, an independent franchisee association improves the bargaining
position of franchisees vis-A-vis franchisors. As a result, the association
is assumed to succeed in negotiating contract terms that protect
franchisees from franchisor opportunism and thereby eliminate the need
for franchisee protection laws.
This Article questions the idea that independent franchisee
associations can prevent franchisor opportunism and otherwise serve as a
substitute for franchisee protection laws. Focusing on the implicit
assumption that such associations exist, or at least have the potential to
* Huber Hurst Professor of Business Law & Legal Studies, Warrington College of
Business Administration, University of Florida. B.A., Sewanee: University of the South,
1978; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982.
** Assistant Professor, College of Law and Business. J.S.D., University of
California, Berkeley, 2006; LL.M., Columbia University, 2005; LL.B., Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, 2003.
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Gideon Parchomovsky, Andrew Selden, and Eyal Zamir for their invaluable comments
and critique.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:1

exist, this Article argues that, in most cases, franchisees are unlikely to
establish independent franchisee associations in the first place-mainly
because under current law the expected costs borne by the franchisee in
leading the establishment of an association exceed the expected benefits.
That is, as federal and most state laws fail to adequately prohibit the
franchisor's retaliatory termination of the franchise or other reprisals
against a franchisee association leader, the probability of such retribution
is significant; conversely, the probability that the franchisee will form a
successful and sustainable association is very low. First, franchisors
often establish, fund, and control a competing franchisee committee,
known as the franchisor advisory council, which is likely to reduce
considerably the probability that an independent franchisee association
will operate successfully. Second, franchisees normally have little
incentive to join and actively participate in an already functioning
independent franchisee association for several reasons, including
franchisee free-riding, franchisee fear of retaliation by franchisors, and
economic incentives provided by franchisors to franchisees for not
joining such associations.
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INTRODUCTION

Franchising plays a vital role in the U.S. economy. There are over
These establishments
700,000 franchised business establishments.'

1.

IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, FRANCHISE BUSINESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MAY 2012 1

(2012), availableat http://emarket.franchise.org/BusinessOutlookReport2012.pdf.
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provide approximately eight million jobs.2 Furthermore, they annually
produce goods and services worth more than $700 billion, and they
contribute more than $400 billion to the GDP.3 Given the economic
magnitude of franchising, it is not surprising that policymakers, legal
theoreticians, franchisors, and franchisees have had differences of
opinion regarding the desired rights and duties of the parties involved in
the franchise industry. In the last few decades, the most vital debate in
franchise law has focused on whether state or federal law should protect
franchisees against potential opportunistic behavior of franchisors toward
franchisees. 4 This issue is currently being debated in several states. For
example, representatives in California have recently introduced a new
bill, The Level Playing Field for Small Business Act of 2012, which, if
enacted, would provide significant protection for franchisees against
franchisor opportunism. 5 Similarly, a Massachusetts bill, An Act Further
Regulating Franchise Agreements, has been introduced recently in an
effort to protect franchisees against franchisor opportunism. 6 Another
bill aiming to curb franchisor opportunism was introduced recently in
Vermont.7 The debate over the desirability of franchisee protection laws
2. Alisa Harrison & Matthew Hailer, Franchise Growth Lags as Fiscal Cliff
Threatens
Expansion,
INT'L
FRANCHISE
ASS'N
(Sept.
10,
2012),

http://www.franchise.org/IFANEWS/FranchiseGrowthLags
nsExpansion.
3.

AsFiscalCliffThreate

IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 1.

4. The major types of franchisor opportunistic behavior at which franchisee
protection laws are aimed will also be explained in Part III. On the scholarly debate over
the desirability of franchisee protection laws, see, for example, ROGER D. BLAIR &
FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 233-34 (2005); Roger D. Blair
& Francine Lafontaine, Understandingthe Economics of Franchisingand the Laws that
Regulate It, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 55, 63 (2006);James A. Brickley et al., The Economic
Effects of FranchiseTermination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1991); Robert W. Emerson
& Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed: Revisiting the Debate Over Franchise
Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REv. 193 (2013); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:
A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 314-15 (1975); David Hess, The Iowa
Franchise Act: Towards Protecting Reasonable Expectations of Franchisees and
Franchisors,80 IOWA L. REv. 333 (1995); Richard L. Smith II, FranchiseRegulation: An
Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution,25 J.L. & ECON. 125
(1982).
5. For text of the new proposed bill, see Assemb. 2305, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2012), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?billid=

201120120AB2305.

For a brief review of the bill, see Robert Purvin, California

Introduces Bill for Fairer Franchising, BLUE MAUMAU (Mar. 6, 2012, 8:02 AM),

http://www.bluemaumau.org/l 1336/californiadrafting fair franchisingbill.
6. For text of the new proposed bill, see S. 1843, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 2011), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/Senate/S01843.

For a

brief explanation of the new bill, see Massachusetts Introduces FranchiseBill!, BLUE
MAUMAU
(June
23,
2011,
12:52
PM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/10467/massachusetts introduces franchisebill.
7. For text of the new proposed bill, see H.R. 694, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Vt. 2012), availableat http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2012/bills/Intro/H-694.pdf.
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is global and not limited to the United States. While some countries such
as Australia 8 and China 9 have decided to enact franchisee protection
laws, other countries, such as Japan' and Israel,' 1 have failed to do so.
Within the debate over the desirability of franchisee protection
12
laws, franchisor advocates suggest that such laws are superfluous.
Deeply ingrained in franchisor advocates' opposition to such legislation
is the belief that independent franchisee associations, namely trade
13
associations formed by franchisees within a single franchise chain,
serve as a sufficient barrier against franchisor opportunism. 14 As the late,
prolific law and economics scholar Larry Ribstein contended: "The
benefits of franchisee-protection laws are unclear. Even without such
laws, franchisees can... coordinate resistance to franchiser opportunism
through franchisee associations .
,,15 Similarly, Thomas Pitegoff, a
8. Australia enacted a franchisee protection law called "The Franchising Code of
Conduct."
See Franchising Code of Conduct 2010 (Cth) (Austl.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2010C00457.
9. China enacted a franchisee protection law called "The Regulation on the
Administration of Commercial Franchises." See Regulation on the Administration of
Commerce (promulgated by the St. Council, Feb. 6, 2007, effective May 1, 2007)
(China), availableat http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2007-02-06/23214.shtml.
10. See Etsuko Hara, Japan, in FRANCHISE IN 30 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 93
(Philip
F.
Ziedman
ed.,
2012),
available
at
http://www.amtlaw.com/res/news_201 lenpdf/ 11024_2449.pdf ("There are no specific laws regulating
the ongoing relationship between franchisors and franchisees.").
11. In Israel, franchise contracts are mainly governed by general contract law. See
Peggy Sharon & Inbal Natan-Zehavi, Aspects of FranchisingLaw in Israel, LEVITAN,
SHARON & Co., http://www.israelinsurancelaw.com/franchise-and-distribution/aspects-offranchising-law-in-i.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). On the Israeli debate over the
desirability of franchisee protection laws see, for example, Shuki Sade, Trapped in the
Net, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1212149 (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (translated
from Hebrew to English by authors).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See Michael Einbinder & Eric H. Karp, So You've Bought Your First Boat:
Forming an Independent Franchisee Association... A Turn-Key Approach 5 (May 4-5,
2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ed-lawfirm.com/News-andEvents/First-Boat.pdf. "The governance of [independent franchisee associations] is
usually completely free of input from the franchisor .. " Benjamin Lawrence & Patrick
J. Kaufmann, Identity in Franchise Systems: The Role of FranchiseeAssociations, 87 J.
RETAILING 285, 288 (2011) [hereinafter Lawrence & Kaufmann, Identity in Franchise
Systems],
available
at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002243591000093X#.
14. See infra Part III.
15. Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in ContractualChoice of Law, 37
GA. L. REv. 363, 397 (2003) [hereinafter Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics]. See also
James A. Brickley et al., supra note 4, at 115 (discussing the political strength of
franchisee associations); W. John Moore, FranchiseesAre Sizzling, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8,
1992, at 340, 340-41 (discussing how franchisee associations can limit franchisor
opportunism). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245,
276 (1993) [hereinafter Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract] (suggesting that
"franchisees within a given state may be more influential than the national franchiser
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member of the legislative committee of the International Franchise
Association, argued:
"Franchise relationship laws are based on
legislative findings of an inequality of bargaining power between
franchisors and franchisees, and of abuses by franchisors ....
In fact,
there is far less inequality today between franchisors and franchisees....
16
[F]ranchisee associations are wielding more power than ever."'
Although organizing into independent franchisee associations may
give franchisees "increasing voice and leverage,"' 7 this Article questions
the idea that independent franchisee associations can substitute for
franchisee protection laws. More specifically, this Article argues that in
most cases, independent franchisee associations are unlikely to be
established in the first place. In short, the argument is as follows:
typically, an individual franchisee is unlikely to lead the formation of an
independent franchisee association because the franchisee leader's
expected costs of leadership exceed her expected benefits. On the
expected costs side, the franchisee leader is exposed to harmful
retaliation on the part of the franchisor for her role as leader, which may
take on the drastic form of contract termination.18 The probability of
such harmful retaliation is significant given that, as opposed to labor law,
which prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who
forms an association, federal and most state franchise laws do not

organization," but nonetheless have little impact on legislation because legislatures want
to create efficient laws that are not harmful to business in the state).
16. Thomas M. Pitegoff, FranchiseRelationship Laws: A Minefieldfor Franchisors,
45 Bus. LAW. 289, 314-15 (1989). See also AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION

SECTION

OF ANTITRUST

LAW ON

PROPOSED

SMALL BUSINESS

FRANCHISE
ACT
n. 14
(Dec.
13,
1999),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust law/report 2eOe95
b.authcheckdam.pdf ("More recently, some believe [that the] disparities [of power
between franchisors and franchisees] have lessened as the result of ... the advent of
franchisee associations .. ");Carla Wong McMillian, What Will It Take to Get You in a
New Car Today?: A Proposalfor a New FederalAutomobile Dealer Act, 45 GONZ. L.
REV. 67, 87 (2010) ("The power of the franchisees is enhanced even further through
franchisee associations that often negotiate the terms of these contracts on behalf of large
groups of franchisees.").
17. Marc Ballon, FranchiseesOrganize to Counter Company Power, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2000, http://articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/23/business/fi-1625 (quoting Richard
Purvin, president of the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers in San Diego,
California).
18. See infra Part IV.A.1. Certainly, alleged franchisor retaliation may occur in
response to franchisee claims against the franchisor. See, e.g., Duff v. Marathon
Petroleum Co., 51 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1995) (personal injury); United Consumers
Club, Inc. v. Bledsoe, 441 F. Supp. 2d 967, 979 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (breach of contract);
Baker v. Amoco Oil Co., 761 F. Supp. 1386, 1392 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (fraud), affd, 956
F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1992); Gilderhus v. Amoco Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (D.
Minn. 1979) (breach of contract). However, the focus of this Article is termination as
retaliation for franchisee association activities.
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adequately prohibit franchisors from taking retaliatory actions against a
leading franchisee. 9
On the expected benefits side, the probability that the leading
franchisee will succeed in forming a sustainable association is very
low. 20 The establishment of an independent franchisee association faces
two unique and noteworthy obstacles. First, franchisors often establish,
fund, and control a competing franchisee committee, known as a
franchisor advisory council, which serves franchisors as a tool to reduce
the probability that an independent franchisee association will survive.
Specifically, franchisors often refuse to negotiate with the independent
franchisee association members once such an association is established,
claiming that the franchisees' concerns are addressed through the
franchisor advisory council.2' Second, franchisees have little incentive to
join and actively participate in an independent franchisee association
once it is formed because: (1) a franchisee's basic incentive is to freeride on the efforts of other franchisees that will support the independent
association; (2) franchisees fear harmful retaliatory actions by the
franchisor; and (3) sometimes, franchisees may be enticed by franchisor
benefits to refrain from joining the association.22
This Article's theoretical argument, that in most cases independent
franchisee associations are unlikely to be established in the first place, is
backed by industry data that have accumulated over recent years, and
which have so far been overlooked in the debate over franchisee
protection laws. The industry data reveal that of the approximate 3,000
franchise chains in the United States, only a small percentage of chains
have independent franchisee associations.2 3
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II will provide legal
context by briefly reviewing the statutory framework underlying the
debate over the desirability of franchisee protection laws. Part III will
furnish theoretical context by outlining the central argument on which
franchisor advocates base their opposition to franchisee protection
laws-namely, that franchisee associations can prevent franchisor
opportunism. Finally, Part IV will include cost-benefit analysis and
industry data while presenting the authors' critique of the franchisor
advocates' argument.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part IV.A.2.
infra Part IV.B.
infra Part IV.B. 1.
infraPart IV.B.2.
infra Part IV.C.
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FRANCHISEE PROTECTION LAWS--OVERVIEW

Franchisee protection laws are statutes that primarily govern the
ongoing relationship between franchisors and franchisees.24 These laws
have two central, alleged purposes:
first, to correct a perceived
25
inequality in bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees;
and second, to protect franchisees against perceived franchisor
opportunism. 26 The major types of franchisor opportunistic behavior at
27
which franchisee protection laws are aimed come in several forms.
First, the franchisor may terminate the contract unjustly; specifically, the
franchisor may terminate the contract without a material breach by the
franchisee to appropriate the profits of the franchisee unit. This
termination is accomplished either by operating the outlet directly or
selling it to a new franchisee under a contract involving higher fees.28
Second, the franchisor may require contractually that any dispute be
arbitrated outside the franchisee's state in order to increase franchisee
24. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-401 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-2 (West
2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-2 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-558 (2011); Thomas
M. Pitegoff & W. Michael Garner, FranchiseRelationship Laws, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
FRANCHISING 183, 184 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008); Hess,
supra note 4, at 346-47.
25. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 135.025(2)(b) (2011); see also Christopher J. Curran,
Claims Against a Franchisor upon an Unreasonable Withholding of Consent to
Franchise Transfer, 23 J. CORP. L. 135, 152 (1997); Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S.
Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling Franchisor: The Case for More, Not
Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139, 141 (2010); Dennis D. Palmer,
Franchises: Statutory and Common Law Causes of Action in Missouri Revisited, 62
UMKC L. REV. 471, 491 (1994); Pitegoff, supra note 16, at 289.
26. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 135.025(2)(b) (2011); see also Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29
F.3d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1994); Bitronics Sales Co. v. Microsemiconductor Corp., 610
F. Supp. 550, 556 (D. Minn. 1985); Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., No.
CV 96562061S, 1997 WL 297256, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 1997), aff'd, 736
A.2d 824 (Conn. 1999); Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724,
728-29 (Iowa 1995); McDonald's Corp. v. Markim, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Neb.
1981); Kubis & Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 626 (N.J.
1996); David L. Cahn & Jeffrey S. Fabian, Mobility, the Home, and the Scope and
Application of State Franchise Relationship and Termination Laws, 30 FRANCHISE L.J.
107, 107 (2010); Curran, supra note 25, at 152; Palmer, supra note 25, at 491; Pitegoff,
supra note 16, at 289.
27. See Lagarias & Boulter, supra note 25, at 143-44; Pitegoff& Garner, supra note
24, at 187-88; Pitegoff, supranote 16, at 329-3 1.
28. A number of states have laws dealing with the rights and responsibilities related
to franchise terminations. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-209 (2011); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 20020-21 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(H) (2011); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 705/19 (2011); IOWA CODE §§ 523H.7(l), 537A.10(7)(c) (2011); MrNN.
STAT. § 80C.14(3)(b) (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-57 (2011); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 407.405(1) (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-404 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5
(West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-20.2 (2011); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 278a (2011);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-50-4 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180(2)0) (2011); Wis.
STAT. § 135.03 (2011).
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litigation costs, thereby deterring her from suing the franchisor. 29 Third,
the franchisor may encroach on the franchisee's territory, namely by
establishing a new franchise unit in unreasonable proximity to an
existing franchisee, dramatically reducing the franchisee's profitability
and thereby causing her to abandon the chain.3 °
To date, only a minority of states has enacted general franchisee
protection laws aiming to curb franchisor opportunism. 3 I At the federal
level, several general franchise relationship bills have been introduced,
but all have been rejected.32
For example, a federal franchise
relationship law of general application was proposed in 1971, but it was

29. For examples of laws prohibiting this practice, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 20040.5 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1573 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 80C.21
(2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-14 (2011).
30. States have also passed laws prohibiting this practice. See, e.g., HAW. REV.
STAT. § 482E-6(2)(E) (2011); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1(2), (9) (2011); IOWA CODE
§ 523H.6(1) (2013); MINN. R. 2860.4400(C) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.100.180(2)(f) (2011). Such an encroachment strategy is sometimes used by
franchisors in order to achieve one central hidden objective: to evade a contractual or
statutory obligation to pay damages to a franchisee upon contract termination. See
Michael Garner, A Termination by Any Other Name, BLUE MAUMAU (Feb. 14, 2008, 5:22
PM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/atermination byanyother-name.
Instead of
formally and directly terminating the franchise contract-a behavior that may expose the
franchisor to an obligation to pay damages to the terminated franchisee-franchisors use
an encroachment strategy. Id. This strategy "erode[s] [the] franchisee's business to the
extent that it is no longer viable, causing the franchisee to [surrender the business]." Id.
Thus, encroachment allows "the franchisor [to] accomplish[] indirectly what it might not
be able to accomplish lawfully through a direct termination." Id. Similarly, some
franchisors use an encroachment strategy in order to reduce the profitability of their
franchisees' units, such that the units eventually will be less expensive for the franchisor
to repurchase from the franchisee. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d
704, 719 (7th Cir. 1979). For more on the subject, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Encroachment,47 AM. Bus. L.J. 191 (2010).
31. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-72-201 to -210 (2007); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 20000-10 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2551-56 (2005); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 482E-1 to -11 (2007); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/1 to /11 (2009); IND. CODE §§ 23-22.5-1 to -51 (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 523H. 1-. 17 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 445.1501-.1546 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80C.01-.30 (West 2006);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-401 to -410 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West
2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-5A-1 to -87 (2006) (repealed 2008), available at
http://law.justia.com/codes/south-dakota/2006/37/37-5a.html; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4725-1501 to -1511 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-557 to -574 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 19.100.010-.940 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 135.01-.07 (West 2006). The District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands also have franchisee protection laws. See
D.C. CODE § 34-1731.06 (2013); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 278-278d (2006); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 130-39 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Ernest A. Braun, Policy Issues of Franchising,14 Sw. U. L. REV. 155,
203-04 (1984); Robert W. Emerson, FranchiseTerminations: Legal Rights and Practical
Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 559,
562-63 (1998); Donald P. Horwitz & Walter M. Volpi, Regulating the Franchise
Relationship,54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 217, 218 (1980).
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not enacted.33 In 1992, former Democratic Congressman James H.
Scheuer introduced a franchise relationship bill that was also not
passed.34 Similarly, former Democratic Congressman John J. LaFalce in
1993 and 1995, and Republican Congressman Howard Coble in 1998
and 1999, each proposed franchise relationship bills that did not pass. 35
In addition, in 2007, the Federal Trade Commission considered,
but
eventually rejected, federal regulation of the franchise relationship.36
III.

THE FRANCHISOR ADVOCATES' VIEW

Franchisor advocates suggest that franchisees do not need special
protection laws to provide legal protection against franchisor
opportunism. Essential to the resistance against franchisee protection
laws is the argument that independent franchisee associations can
function as a substitute for legislation. 37 Franchisor advocates argue that
the benefits of franchisee protection laws are unclear because franchisees
can coordinate resistance to franchisor opportunism through franchisee
associations, even without such laws.38
In particular, franchisor
advocates suggest that by collectivizing a large percentage of the
franchisees in the franchise system, independent franchisee associations
improve the bargaining position of franchisees.3 9 The assumption made
by franchisor advocates is that the association's collective leverage
places the association at a strong advantage in negotiations with the

33. Pitegoff & Garner, supra note 24, at 185.
34. See Federal Fair Franchising Practices Act of 1992, H.R. 5961, 102nd Cong.
(1992).
35. See Small Business Franchise Act of 1999, H.R. 3308, 106th Cong. (1999);
Small Business Franchise Act of 1998, H.R. 4841, 105th Cong. (1998); Federal Fair
Franchise Practices Act, H.R. 1717, 104th Cong. (1995); Federal Fair Franchise Practices
Act, H.R. 1316, 103d Cong. (1993).
36. Pitegoff & Garner, supra note 24, at 186.
37. See Pitegoff, supra note 16, at 314-16; Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics,
supra note 15, at 397; Mary deLeo, Note; Emasculating Goliath: Did Postal Instant Press
v. Sealy Strike an Unfair Blow at the FranchisingIndustry?, 25 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117,
163 n.279, 172 (1997). See also Ann Hurwitz & Rochelle B. Spandorf, Introduction to
BUILDING FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIPS: A GUIDE TO ANTICIPATING PROBLEMS, RESOLVING
CONFLICTS, AND REPRESENTING CLIENTS xxiii, xxiii-xxiv (Ann Hurwitz & Rochelle
Buchsbaum Spandorf eds., 1996).
38. See Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics, supra note 15, at 397. See also Scott
McIntosh, Fair Criticism, Cyberlibel, and Unlawful Coordinated Action over the
Internet, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 181, 181-82 (2001) (suggesting that the free flow of
communication via the internet will stimulate both formal and informal franchise
associations).
39. See Deborah S. Coldwell, Initial Pleadings, in FRANCHISE LITIGATION
HANDBOOK 1, 2 (Dennis LaFiura & C. Griffith Towle eds., 2010) ("A franchisor is more
likely to find a reasonable solution when confronted by a large franchisee group.").
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franchisor regarding the franchise contract terms.40 As a result, the
association is presumed to be successful in negotiating contract terms
that protect franchisees from franchisor opportunism, eliminating the
need for franchisee protection laws. As Thomas Pitegoff suggests,
"franchisee associations ensure that the entire franchise' system is fair,
thereby protecting the newcomers among the franchisees. AI
IV. THE CRITIQUE

The franchisor advocates' argument that independent franchisee
associations serve as a substitute for franchisee protection laws rests on

40. See McMillian, supra note 16, at 87 ("The power of the franchisees is enhanced
even further through franchisee associations that often negotiate the terms of these
contracts on behalf of large groups of franchisees."); deLeo, supra note 37, at 264 n.279
("Much debate, however, has centered around the question of whether these franchise
relationship statutes are still necessary today. The recent emergence of strong,
sophisticated franchisees, coupled with the advent of franchisee associations, has led to a
realignment of power in some franchise systems, and the 'take it or leave it' attitudes
typical of franchisors in the 1970's and 1980's are giving way as franchisors become
increasingly sensitive to the collective power of their franchisees."). See also Nicholas
Argyres & Janet Bercovitz, The Impacts of Efficiency and Bargaining Power on Contract
Structure: Evidence from Franchising 13 (Feb. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1554037 ("[I]ndependent franchisee associations
appear to be formed with the primary purpose of gaining negotiating leverage").
41. Pitegoff, supra note 16, at 316; see also Coldwell, supra note 39, at 2
("Systemwide change through litigation can be expensive to resolve... [and] more likely
to provoke a vigorous defense from the franchisor. Thus ...a franchisee attempting to
modify a systemwide issue may consider joining forces with other franchisees or
pursuing litigation through a franchisee association."); Benjamin Lawrence & Patrick J.
Kaufnann, Franchisee Associations: Strategic Focus or Response to Franchisor
Opportunism, 17 J. MARKETING CHANNELS 137, 138 (2010) [hereinafter Lawrence &
Kaufmann, Franchisee Associations] ("In [independent franchisee associations],
franchisees band together into a cohesive unit that often wields sufficient countervailing
power to ensure that they receive a fair deal from their franchisors."); Ribstein, Choosing
Law by Contract, supra note 15, at 259 ("[F]ranchisees, rather than being helpless, can
effectively coordinate resistance to opportunism by franchisers by forming franchisee
associations."). However, when an association is formed, some franchisors are suddenly
hostile to the idea, regarding associations as "confrontation[al]." See RICHARD L.
KOLMAN & HARRIS J. CHERNOW, FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATIONS AND FRANCHISE ADVISORY

COUNCILS ("FAC"): A REVIEW OF THE FUNDAMENTALS AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

at
available
(2007),
9
RESOURCES
HELPFUL
OF
http://kfcog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/9/7/13973429/franchiseeassoc ifas and facs-whit
epaper.pdf. It seems franchise associations are often born out of discontent with a
franchisor or FAC, which supports the assumption that franchisors see associations as
hostile entities. See ROGER SCHMIDT, SR. & HARRIS J. CHERNOW, MANAGING THE
available at
(2009),
3
ASSOCIATION
FRANCHISE
A
OF
ORGANIZATION
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/franchising/events-cle/past_program-materials.html;
JOSEPH SCHUMACHER, WILLIAM DARRIN & LAWRENCE COHEN, EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS
WITH FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATIONS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS 4 (2001), available at
http://www.wiggin.com/files/Effective%20Relationships%20with%20Franchisee%2OAss
ociations.pdf.
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an implicit assumption that such associations exist, or, that such
associations at least have the potential to exist, in most chains. This
assumption, however, is dubious. In most cases, independent franchisee

associations are unlikely to be established because the expected costs of
forming an association typically exceed the expected benefits for
individual franchisees considering whether or not to establish an
association.42
A.

High Expected Costsfor FranchiseeAssociation Leader

The expected costs of forming an independent franchisee
association are high due to two central cumulative reasons.4 3 First, the
franchisor may decide to retaliate against the leading franchisee if he or
she establishes, or attempts to establish, an association, thus causing the
franchisee significant harm. 44 Second, the probability that the franchisor
will retaliate against the leading franchisee is significant.45
1.

High Retaliation Costs

Harmful retaliation by franchisors against association leaders may
take several forms. For example, a franchisor may not renew the
contract with the franchisee association leader,4 6 or the franchisor may
elect not to allow the leader to open new units in the franchise chain.47
42. Also, many franchisee associations ultimately fail, even if they are initially
supported by the franchisor. See SCHMIDT & CHERNOW, supra note 41, at 10.
43. By "costs," the authors are referring to the potential consequences to a franchisee
for establishing an independent franchisee association. Interestingly, the monetary startup costs for establishing an independent franchisee association are actually quite low,
usually "limited to [the cost of] hiring a lawyer to create a corporation or legal entity and
the costs of the initial membership drive." Forming an Independent Franchisee
LLP,
http://www.singler-law.com/guides/
& DILLON,
Association, SINGLER
association.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). These start-up costs are usually divided
among the organizers equally or based on the size of the franchisee. Id. If the
association attracts members, the start-up costs may be repaid through membership dues.
Id. In California, the cost to hire a lawyer to create a corporation or legal entity ranges
between $1100 and $1500. See CaliforniaIncorporation/Corporations,LAW OFFICE OF
JONAS M. GRANT, A.P.C., http://www.incorporatecalifornia.com/corporations.html (last
visited Aug. 16, 2013).
44. See infra Part IV.A.1.
45. See infra Part IV.A.2.
46. See Russell M. Knight, The Role of FranchiseeAssociations, 3 CAN. J. ADMIN.
SCI. 114, 119 (1986) (noting that McDonald's allegedly punished franchisees by not
renewing their franchises).
47. See Dunafon v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 93-4490-CV-C-9, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22026, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 1996) (recounting instance in which the franchisor
publicly stated that the leaders of the franchisee association would not be granted
expansion rights within the franchisor system); STAN LUXENBERG, ROADSIDE EMPIRES
270 (1985) (noting that Taco Bell moved to oppose an association that franchisees were
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In another common practice, a franchisor may withhold consent to the
association leader's request to transfer her franchisee unit to a third
party,48 or the franchisor may simply schedule excessive inspections for
the association leader. 49 Most dramatically, franchisors may terminate
the franchise contract with the franchisee association leader.5
Such
harsh retaliatory action entails significant costs on the part of the
association leader. These costs mainly include, as will be 5 explained
below in more detail, loss of relationship-specific investments. '
Relationship-specific investments, also known as idiosyncratic
investments, are investments specific to a concrete franchise
relationship.52 They are highly specialized and tailored to that franchise
relationship53 and, as such, are difficult or impossible to redeploy to

forming and dropped hints to franchisees that troublemakers may not be permitted to
open additional units); Knight, supra note 46, at 119 (stating that McDonald's allegedly
harassed the franchisees by not allowing them to open new units).
48. See Popeyes, Inc. v. Tokita, Civ. A. Nos. 87-3011, 90-1179, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13295, at *32-33 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 1993) (finding that the franchisor
unreasonably withheld written consent to transfer the franchisee's unit to other
franchisees to retaliate for the franchisee's activities in a franchisee association).
49. See Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Mack, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 9530 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 29, 1989) (relating how the franchisor surveyed and photographed the unit of a
franchisee who was a leader of a franchisee association); Knight, supra note 46, at 119
(describing how McDonald's allegedly harassed the franchisee with frequent visits from
quality control inspectors who cite the operator for small infractions); Joseph
Schumacher et al., Effective Relationships with Franchisee Associations-Legal and
Practical Aspects 32 (May 6-8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.franchise.org/files/Effective%20Relationships%2OWith%20Franchisee%20A
ssoc.PDF.
50. See, e.g., Bray v. QFA Royalties LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1239 (D. Colo.
2007) (recounting instance in which the franchisor sent letters terminating the franchise
rights of all of the franchisee association board members); Cherick Distribs., Inc. v. Polar
Corp., 669 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (detailing the franchisor's termination
of its agreement with a franchisee upon discovering that the franchisee had written a
letter to other franchisees urging them to attend a meeting to discuss the possibility of
forming a franchisee association); PepperidgeFarm, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 9530
at 9530 (describing the franchisor's termination of the franchisee for the latter's
leadership role in a franchisee association); ROBERT L. PURvIN, JR., THE FRANCHISE
FRAUD 211 (2008) (noting that McDonald's punished the association leaders by
terminating their franchises); Knight, supra note 46, at 119.
51. The following explanation is based on Uri Benoliel, Rethinking the U.S. Supreme
Court'sAbandonment Requirement in Mac's Shell Service Inc. v. Shell Oil Products, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 83-86 (2011).
52. See Erin Anderson & Barton Weitz, The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain
Commitment in DistributionChannels, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 18, 20 (1992).
53. See Shankar Ganesan, Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller
Relationships, 58 J. MARKETING 1, 6 (1994); Jan B. Heide & George John, The Role of
Dependence Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional
Channels,52 J. MARKETING 20,21 n. 1 (1988).
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another relationship.54 Therefore, they have little or no salvage value to
a franchisee association leader once the franchisor terminates her
contract. 55
Relationship-specific investments include leasehold
improvements, namely fixtures that are attached to the retail or
commercial space and installed by the franchisee when setting up a new
location.56
Examples of such improvements include walls, doors,
cabinets, light fixtures, and floor coverings.57 Such improvements may
be significant. For example, a Subway franchisee may be required to
invest up to $130,000 in leasehold improvements.58
Leasehold improvements
are
often
relationship-specific
investments, which are lost if the franchisor terminates the contract with
the association leader. This loss is incurred because franchisors often
require the franchisee to lease, rather than own, the land upon which the
outlet is located.5 9 The lease arrangement grants the franchisor the right
to require the franchisee to evacuate the leased property upon termination
of the franchise. 60 As a result, the leasehold improvements, which
remain the property of the franchisor, must be surrendered by the
franchisee along with the property, causing the franchisee significant
61
economic loss.

Equipment expenditures are another form of relationship-specific
investment lost by an association leader if the franchise agreement is
terminated by a retaliating franchisor. Depending upon the conditions of
54. See Anderson & Weitz, supra note 52, at 20; Heide & John, supra note 53, at 21
n. 1.
55. Cf James R. Brown et al., The Effects of Transaction-Specific Investments in
Marketing Channels: The Moderating Role of Relational Norms, 17 J. MARKETING
THEORY & PRAc. 317, 317 (2009) ("Transaction-specific investments ... have little or no
value outside of that relationship."); Ganesan, supra note 53, at 6 ("Transaction-specific
assets are investments in durable assets that are ... not easily redeployable and have little
salvage value in other relationships."); Jan B. Heide & George John, Alliances in
Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint Action in Buyer-Supplier
Relationships, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 24, 27 (1990) ("Specific investments are
investments made by a firm that are of considerably less value outside the focal
relationship.").
56. See Franchise Tutorial 20: Intro to Leasehold Improvements, CAN. FRANCHISE
Ass'N (Jan. 2011), http://www.cfa.ca/PublicationsResearch/Tutorials/tutorial20.aspx.
57. Id.
58. See
Subway,
FRANCHISE
DIRECT,
http://www.franchisedirect.com/directory/subway/ufoc/915 (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
59. See ANNE T. COUGHLAN ET AL., MARKETING CHANNELS 539 (7th ed. 2006);
Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" ContractualArrangements,
70 AM. ECON. REv. 356, 359 (1980).
60. See Klein, supra note 59, at 359.
61. Antony W. Dnes, 'Unfair' Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise
Contracts, 148 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 484, 487 (1992) ("Tenants normally make
alterations to commercial premises (leasehold improvements) which must be given up
with the property. If the franchisor fails to renew the lease the franchisee cannot adapt
improvements to other uses.").
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the space and the particular business model, the required equipment
expenditures can be extensive. For example, a McDonald's franchisee
may be required to invest more than one million dollars in equipment,
including signs, seating, and d6cor. 62 Frequently, much of the equipment
purchased cannot be used outside the franchise and, thus, the expenditure
is relationship-specific. 63
For example, the fast-food franchisee's
outdoor signs cannot be used by the franchisee with any other
franchisor. 64 Similarly, franchise-specific d6cor is regarded as worthless
outside the franchisee's chain.6 5 As a result, if the franchisor terminates
the contract with a franchisee association leader,
the latter's specialized
66
equipment must be resold at a substantial loss.
2.

High Probability of Retaliation

The probability that the franchisor will retaliate against a franchisee
association is high because the franchisor's expected benefits from
retaliation are significant, 67 and because the franchisor's expected costs
of retaliation are relatively low. 68 Normally, the franchisor will not view
69
the association as a positive development and will strive to eliminate it.
Generally, it is against the franchisor's interest to allow franchisees to
benefit from the collective sharing of information that an association can
facilitate.7 ° In addition, franchisors endeavor to prevent franchisees from
gaining collective bargaining power. 71 By preventing the establishment
of an association, franchisors seek to maintain, and effectively exploit,
62. See
McDonald's,
FRANCHISE
DIRECT,
http://www.franchisedirect.com/foodfranchises/mcdonalds-franchise-07030/ufoc/
(last
visited Aug. 16, 2013).
63. See, e.g., Antony W. Does, A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts,22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 367, 379-80 (1993).
64. See Brown et al., supranote 55, at 317.
65. See Dnes, supra note 63, at 378. The secondhand value of trademarked
franchise equipment is normally one quarter of its original cost. See COUGHLAN ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 537; Dnes, supra note 63, at 378.
66. Cf.COUGHLAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 537; Dnes, supra note 63, at 377-78;
Warren S. Grimes, Making Sense of State Oil Co. v. Khan: Vertical Maximum Price
Fixing Under a Rule of Reason, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 567, 586 (1997); Warren S. Grimes,
Market Definition in Franchise Antitrust Claims: Relational Market Power and the
Franchisor'sConflict ofInterest, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 243, 250-51 (1999).
67. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 76-112 and accompanying text.
69. See SCHMIDT & CHERNOW, supra note 41, at 8 (stating that as few as three
companies successfully initiated the process of creating an independent franchisee
association); Ballon, supra note 17; Forming an Independent FranchiseeAssociation,
supra note 43.
70. See Eric H. Karp, "Comments Concerning the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Issued by the Federal Trade Commission of October 15, 1999" (Dec. 21, 1999), available
at http://www.fic.gov/bcp/rulemaking/franchise/comments/comment024.htm.
71. See Einbinder & Karp, supra note 13, at 6.
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the gross imbalance of legal and financial power in the franchisorfranchisee relationship.72
A franchisor's retaliatory actions against the leading franchisee can
do far more than just punish an individual "malcontent;" they may
produce three systemic benefits for the franchisor. First, placing pressure
on franchisee association leaders may distract those franchisees from
devoting time and attention to the association's activities. 73 Second,
retaliatory actions against franchisee leaders dissuade other franchisees
from participating in the association, thus further reducing the
association's effectiveness.74 The message sent by such retaliation to the
franchisees in the chain, as a whole, is that support to the independent
franchisee association carries with it high costs, including the very real
risk that one's franchise contract could be terminated.7 5
Third,
retaliatory actions against franchisee leaders are likely to discourage
potential leaders from establishing future associations.
The franchisor's expected costs of retaliation are relatively low
because federal and most state laws do not sufficiently prohibit
franchisors from taking retaliatory actions against leading franchisees.
To date, there is no general federal law that prohibits franchisors from
taking such actions. 76 This legal reality stands in direct contrast to the
legal regime under federal labor law, which prohibits employers from
72. See id.at 7.
73. See David C. Gurnick & Les Wharton, Effective Franchisee Associations,
Advisory Boards and Councils 12 (Oct. 18-20, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).
74. Cherick Distribs., Inc. v. Polar Corp., 669 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Mass. App. Ct.
1996) (finding that the franchisor retaliated against a franchisee who was an organizer of
a franchisee association in order to discourage other franchisees from participating in the
association); Pepperidge Farm, Inc. v. Mack, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 9530 at
9530 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1989) (stating that the franchisor took retaliatory actions against
a franchisee who participated in a franchisee association in order to deter other
franchisees from participating in the franchisee association).
75. Cf Benjamin I. Sachs, EnablingEmployee Choice: A StructuralApproach to the
Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REv. 655, 687 (2010) (providing a similar
argument in the field of employment law).
76. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchisingand the Collective Rights of Franchisees,
43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1520 (1990); cf Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling
Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 105, 121-22
(2004). Relatedly, Steinberg and Lescatre explain:
Franchisors have the resources to make an example of those who would
challenge their interests. By accessing the labor and capital markets with a
franchise business model, franchisors are able to achieve freedom from statutes
which would otherwise protect workers and investors. Franchisees have far
more to lose than hourly employees, and it is not surprising that so many
franchisees are reluctant to join associations; the American Franchisee
Association has an "Anonymous" membership category for franchisees fearing
retaliation.
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taking retaliatory actions against leaders of labor unions.77 Not only is
there no federal general franchise law that prohibits franchisors from
taking retaliatory actions against leading franchisees, but also the two
federal industry-specific statutes expressly geared toward franchising do
not prohibit such actions.78 First, the Automobile Dealer Franchise
Act, 79 commonly known as the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act,

which sets forth procedures that automobile franchisors must follow
during, and at the end of, a franchise contract, does not prohibit
retaliation. 80 Similarly, the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 81 which

sets forth procedures that a gas station franchisor must follow before it
may terminate or refuse to renew a franchisee, does not prohibit
82

retaliation.

In addition, state law does not sufficiently prohibit franchisors from
retaliating against leading franchisees.83 Most states have yet to enact
statutes that protect a franchisee's right to establish a franchisee
association. In fact, only 11 states have enacted general statutes, i.e.,
statutes that are not restricted to particular industries and that-to
84
varying degrees-protect a franchisee's right to form an association.
However, even in these states, franchisees are not explicitly and
unequivocally protected from franchisor retaliation. State statutes are
often too mildly worded,85 and the franchisor conduct prohibited under
these statutes is often defined narrowly. To illustrate, the relevant
Michigan statute voids any provision in a franchise contract that would
prohibit a franchisee from joining an association, but it does not
explicitly provide any protection to franchisee leaders from retaliation in
§§

77.

See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

78.
79.

See Emerson, supranote 76, at 1520.
Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (2006).

157, 158(a)(1) (2006).

80.

See id.

81. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-06, 2821-24, 2841
(2006 & Supp. V 2012).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Peter Lagarias, A Technical Look at Why California's Franchising
Abuse Laws Need an Update, BLUE MAUMAU (Apr. 18, 2012, 10:50 PM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/technicallookwhycalifomia%E2%80%99sfranchisela
w_insufficient (stating that California's franchisee protections should do more to
proscribe unfair franchisor practices, such as interference with franchisees' right of
association).
84. The following states formally protect that right of franchisees to freely associate:
Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, and Washington. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-206 (2011); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 31220 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (2011); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 705/17 (2011); IOWA CODE § 523H.9 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 445.1527
(2004); MINN. R. 2860.440 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-216 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:10-7 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21.1-19 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.100.180 (2011).
85. See Emerson, supra note 76, at 1505.
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the course of the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 86
Several
commentators have contended that many franchisee association statutes
accomplish very little because they merely invalidate "yellow dog"
provisions in franchise contracts. 7 In other words, these statutes only
ban franchise agreements that prohibit franchisees from joining franchise
associations. They do not, however, make it explicitly unlawful for a
franchisor to retaliate against a franchisee for establishing an association.
In similar statutes, such as those in Hawaii and Washington, it is
unlawful for a franchisor to restrict a franchisee from joining an
association, but they do not explicitly prohibit the franchisor from
retaliating against a franchisee that has established an association.88 In
contrast to these states and others that do not have an explicit prohibition
against retaliation, 9 Iowa and Rhode Island explicitly make it unlawful
for a franchisor to retaliate against a franchisee for participatingin an
association.9" Finally, although several states have industry-specific
statutes that deal with franchisees' rights of association, these statutes
cover only a minority of franchise industries, usually the motor vehicles,
gasoline, brewery, and winery industries. 91
In addition to the lack of adequate statutory prohibition of
retaliation, the franchisor's expected costs of retaliation are relatively
86. See MICH. COMp. LAWS § 445.1527 (2004); see also Mark J. Burzych et al.,
Discriminatory Treatment of Franchisees 31 (Oct. 6-8, 2004) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors).
87. See Emerson, supra note 76, at 1556. "'Yellow dog' contracts were employment
agreements in which the employee agreed not to join a labor union." Id. at 1556 n.255
(citations omitted).
88. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180 (2004).
89. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180 (2004).
90. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.9 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-16
(2011). Is a franchisee that establishes a franchise association also, by definition,
participating in the association? In Iowa and Rhode Island, how does the law treat a
franchisee that establishes an association but then chooses not to participate in its
activities? There are no reported regulations or cases on these matters.
91. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-20-10 (1988) (motor vehicle dealers); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1554(1) (1987) (gasoline dealers); CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.3(n) (West 1987)
(motor vehicle dealers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133cc(7) (West 1987) (motor
vehicle dealers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133(0(2) (West 1987) (petroleum product
franchisees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4913(b)(6) (2005) (motor vehicle franchisees);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 563.022(5)(b)(10) (West Supp. 1990) (beer manufacturers or
distributors); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-662(a)(8) (Supp. 1990) (motor vehicle dealers);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1613(3)( 0 (1988) (motor vehicle dealers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 190.070(2)(h) (LexisNexis 1989) (motor vehicle dealers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,

§ 1180 (1980) (automobile dealers); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 10 (West 1984)
(motor vehicle franchisees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80E.13(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1990)
(motor vehicle dealers); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-118.59 (Supp. 1990) (wineries or wine
wholesalers); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-118.19 (1988) (breweries or beer wholesalers). For a
review of industry-specific statutes that protect the right of franchisees to associate, see
Burzych et al., supra note 86, at 32-33, 46-49.
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low due to difficulties of proof often related to the franchisor's high level
of discretionary power. Even if franchisor retaliation is prohibited in
some states, 92 for example, under the common-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, 93 franchisees generally will find it difficult to
prove that retaliation has taken place.94 The difficulty in proving
retaliation is derived from the discretionary nature of franchisor
decision-making under the franchise contract. Franchise agreements
frequently give broad discretion to the franchisor. 95 For example,
franchise contracts often contain language reserving a franchisor's
discretion to open a competing franchise unit in close proximity to an
existing franchisee. 96 The franchisor may also retain discretion regarding
where to place and how to allocate the franchise advertisements.97 In
92. Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Washington have enacted legislation making it unlawful
for a franchisor to retaliate against franchisees for participating in independent
association activities. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-206 (2011); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 31220 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (2003); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/17
(2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.9 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527
(West 2004); MINN. R. 2860.440 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-216 (2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:10-7 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-28.1-19 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.100.180 (2004).
93. See, e.g., Dunafon v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 93-4490-CV-C-9, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22026, at *17-18 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 1996); Cherick Distribs., Inc. v. Polar
Corp., 669 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
94. See Matt Ellis, FranchisorRetaliation: A Thing of the Past?, BLUE MAUMAU
http://www.bluemaumau.org/
AM),
11:46
30,
2010,
(July
franchisor retaliation thingpast ("[M]any franchisees who organize new associations
feel they are targeted by their franchisors--even if they can't prove it."); infra notes 95109 and accompanying text.
95. See Robert W. Emerson, FranchiseContract Clauses and the Franchisor'sDuty
of Care Toward Its Franchisees,72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 392-34, 954-55 (1994) (arguing
that the franchise relationship affords franchisors so much discretionary power that for
many franchise contract clauses the franchisor should be held to a higher standard of care
than simply the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); W. Michael Garner, The
Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Franchising:A Modelfor Discretion, 20 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 305, 321 (1995) (arguing that franchise contracts frequently make certain
actions expressly subject to the franchisor's discretion); James Goniea & Jeffrey Haff,
Termination, Nonrenewal, and Transfer, in FRANCHISE LAW COMPLIANCE MANUAL 351,

366 (Jeffrey A. Brimer ed., 2d ed. 2011) (citing numerous cases and discussing how
franchisor discretion may challenge and undermine the franchisee's reasonable
contractual expectations).
96. See Elizabeth C. Spencer, Balance of Power, Certainty and Discretion in the
Franchise Relationship: An Analysis of Contractual Terms, BOND UNIVERSITY
EPUBLICATIONS 13 (June 21, 2008), http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1248&context-lawpubs. Indeed, antitrust laws may incentivize franchisors not
to cooperate with franchisees or their associations in the forming of "network expansion
restrictions" or in the setting of prices. See Frederic Cohen, Michael Garner & Erik
Wulff, Potential Liabilities of Franchisors and Franchisee Associations for Concerted
Actions 7-8 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
97. See Spencer, supra note 96, at 19; see, e.g., Hengel, Inc. v. Hot 'N Now, Inc.,
825 F. Supp. 1311, 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (describing franchise agreements that promise
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addition, franchise contracts will give the franchisor discretion to choose
whether or not to renew the franchise at the end of the contract
relationship. 98
In choosing to renew, franchisors will have discretion over the
terms of the renewed franchise contract. Typically, the franchisor can
add higher fees to the renewed contract as well as new restrictions on the
operation of the franchise unit. 99 A franchisor may also have discretion
to require a franchisee to purchase from a supplier whose products are
more expensive than the market price.'0 0 In some cases, a franchisor will
have discretion over whether to approve the franchisee's request to
transfer her franchise unit to a third party. 10' Moreover, a franchisor may
have authority to change certain aspects of the franchise contract,
including the franchise operations manual, computer systems, and level
of control over franchisee premises. 102 Similarly, a franchisor is often
able to dictate the amount of training that it provides to a franchisee. 0 3
A franchisor may also have discretion over whether to approve the
franchisee's request to establish or operate another business similar to the
franchise business. 10 4 Finally, franchisors may have discretion-which is
respected by most states-to terminate the franchise contract "at will,"
i.e., without a material breach on the part of the franchisee. 10 5

that the franchisor will make promotional and marketing information and advice
available "as may periodically be developed and deemed by the Company to be helpful").
98. See Spencer, supra note 96, at 16.
99. See id. at 18.
100. Seeid.at23.
101. See id. at 27; see, e.g., Popeyes, Inc. v. Tokita, Civ. A. Nos. 87-3011, 90-1179,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13295, at *30 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 1993).
102. See Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 867, 885 (N.D. Ill.
1989); Garner, supra note 95, at 307; Spencer, supra note 96, at 35-36.
103. See Spencer, supra note 96, at 35.
104. See H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Vorpahl, 255 F. Supp. 2d 930, 933 (E.D.
Wis. 2003) (upholding a franchise agreement provision barring a franchisee from opening
a similar business during the term of the franchise agreement); Gen. Motors Corp. v. New
A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 733, 739 (D.N.J. 2000) (upholding a franchise
agreement provision barring a franchisee dealership from opening up a competing
dealership at the franchise location), aff'd, 263 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Spencer,
supra note 96, at 35.
105. See Jonathan Klick et al., The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of
Franchising8 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
07-03, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-951464 ("[M]ost franchise contracts
contain at will termination clauses."). At any rate, if a clause more precisely justifying a
termination were needed, such a clause could very likely be found in the written franchise
agreement. See Robert W. Emerson, FranchiseContractInterpretation:A Two-Standard
Approach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming) (examining 100 franchise contracts in
1993 and 100 franchise contracts in 2013 and showing that 100 percent of these
contracts, for both years, had clauses expressly delineating reasons for franchise
termination, such as the franchisee's insolvency, loss of lease, failure to do business,
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Once the franchisor makes a discretionary decision that financially
harms the franchisee association leader, the leader may have difficulty
proving that the franchisor's intent was retaliatory.
Providing
compelling evidence of the franchisor's mental state and subjective
intentions is a very challenging task. 10 6 The franchisor-usually a
sophisticated business entity supported by legal consultants-is likely to
be careful not to draw an explicit and manifest connection between the
harmful discretionary decision and the acts taken by the franchisee
association leader prior to the franchisor's decision.'0 7
Cases of
retaliation, therefore, are difficult to prove because a franchisor neither
declares that retaliation was a motive for his actions nor leaves a welldeveloped trail demonstrating his motive. The franchisor actually has an
incentive to produce information about those intentions that will
demonstrate that the action was not taken in retaliation. 10 8 In fact, it is a
relatively simple task for franchisors to concoct plausible business
reasons for discretionary decisions they may have made against the
franchisee association leader.109
Given the inherent difficulty of proving retaliation in many areas of
law, policymakers have crafted evidence rules that are aimed to facilitate
the proof of reprisal. For example, under certain labor laws, an
employer's actions or response to an employee engaging in a protected
act may raise an initial inference of retaliation.0
Similarly, under the

conduct of an illegal enterprise, finding of criminal guilt, business abandonment, or
denial of franchisor inspections).
106. For a similar argument in the field of employment law and landlord-tenant law,
see Sarah Carrington Walker Baker, A Choice of Rules in Title VII Retaliation Claimsfor
Negative Employer References, 55 DUKE L.J. 153, 169 (2005); Marcia L. McCormick,
The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the
Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 211-12 (2009); Emily A.
Spieler, PerpetuatingRisk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistenceof Occupational
Injuries,31 Hous. L. REV. 119, 230 (1994); Lauren A. Lindsey, Comment, Protecting the
Good-Faith Tenant: Enforcing Retaliatory Eviction Laws by Broadening the Residential
Tenant's Optionsin Summary Eviction Courts, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 101, 115 (2010).
107. See Carl E. Zwisler & Mitchell S. Shapiro, Representing and Dealing with
Franchisee Associations 18 (Oct. 11-13, 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
108. See Baker, supra note 106, at 168.
109. Cf Parada v. Great Plains Int'l of Sioux City, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 777, 791
(N.D. Iowa 2007) ("Because adverse employment actions almost always involve a high
degree of discretion, and most plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are at will, it
is a simple task for employers to concoct plausible reasons for virtually any adverse
employment action ranging from failure to hire to discharge.").
110. See, e.g., Hossaini v. W. Mo. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 1996)
(discussing actions by an employer that can lead to an inference of retaliation in the
employment context); see also PAUL M. IGASAKI, 6 DIGEST OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
LAW
1,
8-18
(1998),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf (describing that a close proximity in time
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landlord-tenant laws of several states, if a landlord's alleged act of
retaliation has occurred shortly after a tenant has organized a tenant's
organization, such act shall be presumed to be retaliatory."' In franchise
law, however, there are no such evidence rules that aim to facilitate the
franchisee's proof of retaliation or pretext. Conversely, some courts
have ruled that the fact that a franchisor's alleged act of retaliation
occurred shortly after a protected activity conducted by the franchisee
does not necessarily give rise to a presumption of retaliatory intent.12
B.

Low Expected Benefits for FranchiseeAssociation Leader

The weak incentive to form an independent franchisee association is
further diminished by the low probability that the leading franchisee will
succeed in forming a sustainable association that has enough members to
influence the franchisor. The establishment of an independent franchisee
first, franchisors often
association faces two deterring obstacles:
establish, fund, and control a franchisees' committee, known as a
franchisor advisory council, which serves franchisors as a tool to reduce
significantly the probability that an independent franchisee association
will survive; and second, an individual franchisee has little incentive to
join and actively participate in an independent franchisee association
once it is formed. These two obstacles are now considered in turn.
1.

Franchisor Advisory Council Barriers

A franchisor advisory council ("FAC") is a committee of
franchisees, established by the franchisor, 1 3 that meets with franchisor
executives on a regular basis.1 4 Normally, the central purpose of a FAC
is to promote communication between franchisees and franchisors on
between the employee's protected action and the employer's alleged retaliatory response
can raise an inference of retaliation).
111. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 5516(c) (2009); IOWA CODE § 562A.36(2)
(1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-46(b) (1986); see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 331381(B) (1973); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.705 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1975).
112. See, e.g., Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 791 (N.D. Cal.
2005).
113. See GLADYS GLICKMAN, FRANCHISING § 3.03[6] (rev. ed. 2012); Keith J.
Kanouse & H. Stephen Brown, AAFD's "FairFranchisingStandards": The Case For,
16 FRANCHISE L.J. 59, 60 (1996); Zwisler & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 2.
114. See Franchise Tutorial 10: Intro to Franchise Advisory Councils, CAN.
FRANCHISE Ass'N (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter Franchise Tutorial 10], http://www.cfa.cal
PublicationsResearchlTutorials/tutoriall0.aspx. Franchisor advisory councils are known
by various names, including advisory councils, franchisee advisory boards, or councils.
See Eric B. Wulff, Advisory Councils: Effective Two-Way Communicationsfor Franchise
Systems,
INT'L FRANCHISE Ass'N 3 (2005), http://www.franchise.org/files/
Advisory0/20Councils.pdf.
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franchise-related matters, such as advertising, field support, operations,
and changing market trends.' 15 FACs are, by their very own definition,
advisory."' As a purely advisory group, FAC recommendations are not
binding on the franchisor. 117
Franchisors tend to absorb all of the organizational expenses of the
FAC, including paying franchisee FAC members the travel and living
expenses incurred to participate in FAC meetings. 1 8 In addition, the
franchisor typically exerts a significant amount of control over the
activities of the FAC. 19 For example, the franchisor usually prepares the
FAC's governing documents, sets up the method for the selection of
FAC members, and announces the conditions for membership. 2 °
Similarly, the franchisor controls the FAC meeting agendas and
schedules.' 2' FACs have been quite common within franchise systems
since the early days of franchising. 122 Today, most franchisors have
23
established FACs.1
Interestingly, FACs are different from independent franchisee
associations. While the typical goal of franchisee associations is to
promote franchisees' bargaining power vis-A-vis the franchisor, 124 FACs
115. See Franchise Tutorial 10, supra note 114; Janet Sparks, FranchiseAdvisory
Council, BLUE MAUMAU, http://www.bluemaumau.org/franchise-advisory_council;
Wulff, supra note 114, at 3. Other stated purposes of FACs may include: enabling the
franchisors to obtain input and advice from franchisees; improving franchisee
understanding of the franchise system; improving the working relationship between
franchisor and franchisees; and providing legitimacy for franchisor decisions by getting
franchisee input in the decision-making purpose. See Gumick & Wharton, supra note 73,
at 4; Zwisler & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 2.
116. See Rupert M. Barkoff & Diane Green-Kelly, Selected Antitrust and Other
Issues Involving Franchisee Associations and Purchasing Cooperatives 3 (Oct. 11-13,
2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Rupert M. Barkoff, Franchise
Associations: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself Usually, INT'L FRANCHISE Ass'N,
http://www.franchise.org/franchise-news-detail.aspx?id=31104 (last visited Aug. 19,
2013).
117. See Rochelle B. Spandorf & Rupert M. Barkoff, Close Encounters: Franchisee
Associations and Councils 14 (Oct. 22-24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
118. See Kanouse & Brown, supra note 113, at 60; Einbinder & Karp, supra note 13,
at 5; Schumacher et al., supra note 49, at 3; Spandorf & Barkoff, supra note 117, at 16;
Zwisler & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 8.
119. See KOLMAN & CHERNOW, supra note 41, at 22; Barkoff & Green-Kelly, supra
note 116, at 3; Zwisler & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 2; Barkoff, supra note 116 ("FACs
are usually formed... in large measure, under the control of the franchisor.").
120. See Barkoff & Green-Kelly, supra note 116, at 3.
121. See id.; Barkoff, supra note 116.
122. See Barkoff & Green-Kelly, supra note 116, at 1.
123. See Rupert M. Barkoff, Collective Bargainingin FranchiseEnvironments, N.Y.
L.J.,
Nov.
17,
2010,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/-/media/Files/articles/201 1/RBarkoffP/20Collective
%20Bargaining.ashx; Wulff, supra note 114, at 4.
124. See Coldwell, supranote 39, at 2.
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lack any real bargaining power, and they are incapable of serving as
useful collective bargaining agents for franchisees for several reasons. 125
First, the bylaws of FACs usually emphasize their communicative role
and do not provide franchisees with the power to negotiate the terms of
the franchise contract that governs the relationship between franchisee
and franchisor. 126 Second, FACs are most often fully funded by
franchisors, which compromises FACs' ability to represent franchisees
effectively. 127 Third, FAC members normally do not have an incentive
to oppose aggressive franchisor policies, or to represent genuinely the
interests of the franchisee community. 128 The seductive promises of
future benefits from franchisors, including renewal of franchise contracts
or approval to open new units, are likely to induce FAC members to
place their loyalties with franchisors, rather than with fellow
franchisees. 129
FACs, therefore, frequently are viewed not as
representative of franchisees' interests but, instead as shills of franchisors
composed of franchisees courting favor with franchisors. 130 FAC leaders
are often thought of as working more for the benefit of franchisors than
the franchisees.'3 1

125. See GLICKMAN, supra note 113 (stating that "[a FAC] typically is not formed to
represent the interests of the franchisees," but rather to "provide a channel of
communication between the franchisees and the franchisor"); Emerson, supra note 76, at
1537 (noting that a FAC "definitely is not a collective bargaining agent"); Lawrence &
Kaufmann, Identity in Franchise Systems, supra note 13, at 287-88 ("Although
ostensibly designed to represent franchisee interests, FACs are often unidirectional
communication devices through which the franchisor speaks to their franchisees, and
[they] are typically viewed as lacking sufficient authority or power to demand change.");
Spandorf & Barkoff, supra note 117, at 26.
126. See Emerson, supra note 76, at 1537.
127. See Einbinder & Karp, supra note 13, at 5.
128. See Spandorf & Barkoff, supra note 117, at 16 ("FAC members tend to be less
adversarial and more consultative than the IFA leadership.").
129. Cf Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production,94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 877
(1994) ("The company union served in part 'as a sort of selection agency through which
those representatives who serve the company with unswerving loyalty are promoted to
higher positions.' Much evidence confirms that representatives knew they stood to gain
foremen or supervisory positions as a reward for being good 'company men.' . . . The
seductions of promotional opportunities, status, perquisites, and constant 'education' in
management's viewpoint generally succeeded in aggregating a loyalist cadre.... ").
130. See Ted P. Pearce & Rupert M. Barkoff, Collective Bargaining and the Franchise
Agreement: Finding the Middle Ground 6 (Oct. 10-12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors).
131. See Lawrence & Kaufmann, Identity in Franchise Systems, supra note 13, at
291. Sometimes the franchisor selects the franchisees who will sit on the FAC. In such
cases, the franchisor will select loyal franchisees rather than franchisees that are
perceived by her as "trouble makers." GLICKMAN, supra note 113, at § 3.03[6]; Spandorf
& Barkoff, supra note 117, at 11.
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FACs often reduce the potential effectiveness of independent
franchisee associations. At the outset, franchisors often use the FAC as a
device to justify refusing to negotiate with the independent franchisee
associations. 13 Specifically, franchisors often refuse to negotiate with
independent franchisee association members by claiming that the
franchisees' concerns are addressed through the FAC.133 For example,
Taco Bell refused to negotiate with an independent franchisee
association within its chain because Taco Bell had formed a FAC where
franchisees could present their views on company policy. 134 Likewise,
when a group of Mail Box Etc. franchisees formed an independent
franchisee association, the franchisor declined to recognize the
association and responded by directing the franchisee association to
communicate with the franchisor through the FAC.3 5
The franchisor's refusal to negotiate with franchisees through the
independent franchisee association reduces the probability that the
association will endure. More specifically, by refusing to negotiate with
the association, the franchisor undermines the central goal of the
independent franchisee association: to maintain a strong position in
negotiations with the franchisor regarding franchise contract terms.
Undermining the association's goal is likely to reduce the incentive of
franchisees to join and support the association. 136 Indeed, the weakness
132. See Kanouse & Brown, supra note 113, at 60. This is simply an excuse in that
ordinarily, regardless of whether a franchisor has a FAC, it may choose to negotiate, or
not, with an independent franchisee association.
133. See Wendy Webb, MBE Redesign Sparks Association Formation,
WIKIDFRANCHISE (Aug. 1, 2000), http://www.wikidfranchise.org/20000801-mberedesign.
134. LUXENBERG,supra note 47, at 270.
135. Ballon, supranote 17; Schumacher et al., supra note 49, at 6-8. Apparently, the
Jackson Hewitt franchisor also said it prefers communicating with franchisees through
the existing FAC. Ballon, supra note 17; see also Lawrence & Kaufmann, Franchisee
Associations, supra note 41, at 150 (noting the frequent statements from a Quiznos
franchisor arguing that a FAC already exists to address franchisee concerns); Don
Sniegowski, Fight Escalates Between Super 8 FranchiseOwners and Their Franchisor,
BLOOMBERG BUS1NESSWEEK (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/
runningsmall business/archives/20 10/0 1/corporate franc.html (reporting how a hotel
chain established and in effect controlled a franchise advisory council while endeavoring
to ignore and undermine the independent franchise association for the franchisees of the
chain).
136. Cf Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944) ("[U]nlawful refusal of an
employer to bargain collectively with its employees' chosen representatives disrupts the
employees' morale, deters their organizational activities, and discourages their
membership in unions."); Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargainin Good Faith, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 1401, 1408 (1958) ("The denial of recognition is an effective means of breaking
up a struggling young union too weak for a successful strike. After the enthusiasm of
organization and the high hopes of successful negotiations, it is a devastating
psychological blow to have the employer shut the office door in the union's face.");
Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DuKE L.J.
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of associations may reduce the chances for franchise legislation. In a
spiraling downward effect, the associations' weakness may lower the
incentive for franchisees to join associations that appear to be ineffective
both in their dealings with the franchisor and in their efforts to achieve
systemic reform via new statutes or regulations. 137
Once again, it must be noted that this franchise law framework, in
which franchisors that establish FACs refuse to negotiate with
independent franchisee associations, contradicts the public policies that
underlie labor law. 138 For example, federal law specifically prohibits
employers from refusing to bargain collectively with the representatives
of their employees because of the potential harm that a refusal 1 to
39
negotiate with a labor union may cause to the union's existence.
Under franchise
law, however, this same behavior by franchisors is not
40
1
prohibited.
In addition, FACs reduce the potential effectiveness of independent
franchisee associations in another way. Sometimes, franchise chains
with FACs also appear to have, at least for a certain period of time,
independent franchisee associations. 14 1 In such cases, members of the
FAC also may be members of the independent association.142 Therefore,
considerations of divided loyalties and confidentiality prevent the FAC
members from operating effectively within the independent

339, 413 n.389 ("An employer's refusal to bargain or other misconduct, if allowed to
continue, may gradually erode employee support for the union.").
137. That is certainly the pattern concerning union strength and membership. See
Ellen J. Dannin, We Can't Overcome? A Case Study of Freedom of Contractand Labor
Law Reform, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 150 n.838 (1995) (suggesting that "weak
unions are unable to achieve favorable legislation"); Ann C. Hodges, Lessonsfrom the
Laboratory: The PolarOpposites on the Public Sector LaborLaw Spectrum, 18 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 735, 756-57 (2009) (suggesting that less union strength diminishes the
chances of new legislation, and that without new legislation, union membership will
remain low); see also Terry Thomason, From Uniformity to Divergence: Industrial
Relations in Canadaand the United States, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 371, 372 (1995)
(reviewing PRADEEP KUMAR, FROM UNIFORMITY TO DIVERGENCE: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1993)) (noting the author's implication "that the
chain of causation is from union strength to legislation rather than vice-versa").
138. Admittedly, franchisees and employees are distinguishable from one another and
should, therefore, be treated differently in certain contexts. See, e.g., Robert W.
Emerson, Franchisees in a Fringe Banking World: Striking the Balance Between
Entrepreneurial Autonomy and Consumer Protection, 46 AKRON L. REv. 1 (2013).
However, this does not appear to be the case for rights with respect to associations.
139. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006).
140. Likewise, because employer-controlled unions ("company unions") may hurt
employees' incentives to form independent unions, federal law prohibits employers from
establishing company unions. Id. § 158(a)(2). In franchise law, though, franchisors can
form FACs. Emerson, supra note 76, at 1538-39.
141. See Zwisler & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 9.
142. Schumacher et al., supra note 49, at 25.
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association.
In addition, the presence of fellow franchisees that are
part of the competing FAC may make some members of the independent
association uncomfortable.' 44 Indeed, in franchise systems in which
FACs and independent 45franchise associations co-exist, franchisee
factions will often spawn.
Given the potential of FACs to reduce the effectiveness of
independent franchisee associations, it is not surprising that the
subjective franchisor motive underlying the establishment of the FAC
often is to hinder the existence or operation of independent franchisee
associations. 46 Likewise, it is also not surprising that when a FAC is
formed after a franchisee association has been established, franchisees
often subjectively view that franchisor-sponsored FAC as a threat to their
association. 147
2.

Franchisees' Weak Incentive to Support an Association

An individual franchisee typically has little, if any, incentive to join
and to participate actively in an independent franchisee association.
Three major reasons explain this lack of incentive. First, each individual
franchisee has a basic incentive to free-ride on the efforts of other
franchisees that will support the independent association 148 because all
franchisees commonly share the same benefits from the association's
collective bargaining power whether they actively participate in the
association or not.1 49 Second, most franchisees are unlikely to join and
participate actively in the association because they fear that the
franchisor will take harmful retaliatory actions against them if they do so.
143. See William A. Darrin et al., The Role of Trade Associations and Franchisee
Associations in Franchising 20 (Oct. 28-30, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors); Schumacher et al., supra note 49, at 25.
144. See Schumacher et al., supra note 49, at 25.
145. See Spandorf& Barkoff, supra note 117, at 1.
146. See HAROLD BROWN, FRANcHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 4.02[1], at 4-38
(rev. ed. 2003); Emerson, supra note 76, at 1504; Carmen D. Caruso, Ten Legal Issues
Facing Independent Franchise Associations 3 (Apr. 28-May 1, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.stahlcowen.com/956B90/assets/files/lawarticles/Ten
Legal Issues Facing
New and Established Independent Franchisee Associations.rtf; Gumick & Wharton,
supra note 73, at 5, 11; Schumacher et al., supranote 49, at 3, 6.
147. See Spandorf& Barkoff, supra note 117, at 11.
148. See Richard Solomon, Why Are There So Few Effective Franchisee
Associations?, BLUE MAUMAU (July 12, 2009, 7:47 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/
whyarethere so few effective_franchisee_associations; Les Stewart, A Man in Debt is
So
Far
a
Slave,
FRANCHISE
FOOL
(June
16,
2010),
https://lesstewart.wordpress.com/tag/free-rider-problem/.
149. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law
and the Searchfor BargainingEquity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419, 457
(1992).
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Indeed, one of the questions most frequently asked by franchisees at an
association organizational meeting is: "What can my franchisor do to me
if Ijoin?"'' ° This fear is justifiable given that federal and most state laws
do not adequately prohibit franchisors from taking retaliatory actions
against franchisees that join or participate in the activity of an
association. 51 This fear is also understandable given that franchisees
will normally find it difficult," under current law, to prove the subjective
intent of retaliation on the part of the franchisor. 152 Finally, some
franchisees are unlikely to join the association because the franchisor
will offer them economic benefits should they refrain from supporting
the association. Indeed, some large franchisees have been known to

150. See Lawrence & Kaufmann, Franchisee Associations, supra note 41, at 150
("There is a perception among many Quiznos franchisees that dissent will be punished.");
Einbinder & Karp, supra note 13, at 19; Eric H. Karp et al., Rally 'Round the Flag: How,
When and Why to Form an Independent Franchisee Association 2 (May 6-7, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Zwisler & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 4
(noting that in their recruiting efforts, association founders need to overcome their
colleagues' fear that they will become victims of overt or subtle retribution if they join).
151. See, e.g., Complaint, Glickman v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., No.
BC340658 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2005), 2005 WL 3032553 (reciting allegations of
retaliation by largest franchisee of popular donut chain where franchisor changed its
supply policies to require franchisee to buy all daily supplies from franchisor and then
began "systematically inflating the prices" of such supplies to force franchisee out of
business because franchisee refused to sell to franchisor-specific stores in the region and
subsequently formed a franchisee association); see also Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 791 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (discussing that even participating in a lawsuit
against a franchisor does not necessarily create a presumption of retaliation without more
evidence); George Lussier Enters. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 231,
239 (D.N.H. 2000) (showing that the franchisor was "angry" at the plaintiff and that the
franchisor had asked other franchisees not to participate in the plaintiff's litigation did not
support a finding of the franchisor's "retaliatory motivation"); Magerian v. Exxon Corp.,
No. C-95-20293 RMW, 1996 WL 119481 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1996) (discussing that
even participating in a lawsuit against a franchisor does not necessarily create a
presumption of retaliation without more evidence); Munno v. Amoco Oil Co., 488 F.
Supp. 1114, 1119 (D. Conn. 1980) (discussing how a franchisor's actions, if following
the franchisor's own normal policy, will indicate good faith, as opposed to retaliation, on
the part of the franchisor). But see Gilderhus v. Amoco Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 1302, 1305
(D. Minn. 1979) (describing Congress' intent to prevent retaliation by franchisors in the
oil franchise context and how the plaintiff had raised "serious questions as to whether the
termination in this case was both discriminatory and retaliatory" where the plaintiff's
franchise agreement was terminated while other franchisees who had engaged in the same
conduct had not had their agreements terminated by the franchisor).
152. See, e.g., George Lussier Enters., 122 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (showing that the
franchisor was "angry" at the plaintiff and that the franchisor had asked other franchisees
not to participate in the plaintiff's litigation did not support a finding of the franchisor's
"retaliatory motivation"); see also Pearman v. Texaco, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 767, 772 (W.D.
Mo. 1979) (holding that a franchisor is entitled to make business judgments about the
franchise relationship that may negatively impact the franchisee or the franchisee's
business if such judgments are made "in good faith in the normal course of business").
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make "sweetheart deals" with their franchisor in return for agreeing not
to support the association.153
Anecdotal evidence confirms that most franchisees are unlikely to
join and actively participate in an association once it is formed. For
example, one in-house counsel stated that the franchisee association 15in4
his chain represents only one percent of all system members.
Likewise, two attorneys serving as counsel to independent franchisee
associations stated that many associations represent less than half of the
system's franchisees. 155 Similarly, the franchisee association at Curves
International succeeded in collecting member fees from only 465 out of
5,830 total franchisees. 156 The association ultimately failed, among other
reasons, due to the unwillingness of franchisees to fund the
association. 5 7 In another example, two other attorneys serving as
counsel to independent franchisee associations stated that they have
witnessed "the rise and quick fall of several franchisee associations who
felt they could organize and represent the interest of their members 15
and
8
retain competent legal counsel for a per member fee of $50 per year.'
3.

Industry Data Support

Franchise industry data, which have been accumulated over recent
years and which so far have been overlooked in the debate over
franchisee protection laws, suggest that in most cases, independent
franchisee associations are unlikely to be established in the first place.
The data reveal that out of approximately 3,000 franchise chains in the

153. See Gurnick & Wharton, supra note 73, at 11-12 (discussing circumstances in
which franchisors persuade key franchisees to remain uninvolved or not to participate in
an association); Karp et al., supra note 150, at 11.
154. Spandorf& Barkoff, supra note 117, at 6.
155. Pearce & Barkoff, supra note 130, at 6. One example of this is Burger King's
Minority Franchise Association. According to the Minority Franchise Association,
Burger King has 7,830 franchisee-owned Burger King stores in the United States. Of that
number, only 1,173 stores are minority-owned. Although the Minority Franchise
Association is a national organization that has been in operation for 26 years, it only
represents 75 of the 1,173 minority-owned franchises. See Burger King Minority
Franchisees Respond to
Boycott,
QSR
MAG.
(Sept.
14,
2000),
http://www.qsrmagazine.com/news/burger-king-minority-franchisees-respond-boycott.
156. CFA Bids Farewell to the Curves Owners Community, CuRvEs FRANCHISE
ASSOCIATION
(Sept.
14,
2011,
06:48
PM),
http://web.archive.org/web/2012081510585 1/www.curvesfa.org/content/cfa-bidsfarewell-curves-owners-community (accessible by searching for curvesfa.org in the
Internet Archive index).
157. Curves: Why Did the Curves FranchiseeAssociation Fail? (Part1), UNHAPPY
FRANCHISEE (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.unhappyfranchisee.com/why-did-the-curvesfranchisee-association-fail- 1/.
158. Zwisler & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 11.
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United States,159 only a few percent have independent franchisee
associations.
An important body that presents such industry data is the American
Association of Franchisees and Dealers ("AAFD"). The AAFD has
dedicated over 20 years to supporting independent franchise
associations.1 60
The AAFD particularly assists franchisees in
establishing and operating independent franchisee associations. In fact,
for a fee, the AAFD allows independent franchisee associations to launch
an association affiliated with the AAFD's trademark. 16 1 This affiliation
is aimed, among other things, at allowing the affiliated associations to
"achieve negotiating leverage with their franchisors, their suppliers and
1 62
ultimately their customers, by developing vital marketing networks.
The goal of the affiliation is also to provide independent franchisee
associations "the opportunity to network and share experiences with
other franchisee associations and leaders and to develop solutions to
common problems."' 63 According to AAFD President Robert Purvin, the
AAFD has successfully identified about 120 U.S. franchise chains that
have independent franchisee associations. 164 This is only four
percent of
6
the estimated 3,000 franchise systems in the United States. 1
Another important source of industry data, which supports this
Article's theoretical argument that franchisee associations are, in most
cases, unlikely to be established, is the International Association
of Franchisees and Dealers ("IAFD"). The IAFD's central goal is to
empower franchisees; 166 it is oriented toward supporting independent
159.

Mary

Connell,

Small

Business

Franchise Relations,

ARTICLERICH,

http://www.articlerich.com/Article/Small-Business-Franchise-Relations/932456
(last
visited Aug. 19, 2013); Kevin Ghezzi, Service Franchises,Sell or Sink, INT'L ASS'N OF
FRANCHSEES & DEALERS (Aug. 24, 2012, 12:18 AM), http://www.franchiseinfo.ca/franchiseeassociation news/2012/08/service-franchises-sell-orsink.html#.UNqsfuRlmql; Eddy Goldberg, Preparing for First Contact With a
Franchisor,

FRANCHISING.COM,

http://www.franchising.com/howtofranchiseguide/preparingfor-firstcontactwith_a-fr
anchisor.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
160. Robert Purvin, Start a FranchiseeAssociation as a Chapter of the AAFD, AM.
ASS'N OF FRANCHISEES & DEALERS (May 24, 2012), http://www.aafd.org/blog/start-afranchisee-association-as-a-chapter-of-the-aafd.
161. AAFD's Four Goals of Service, AM. ASS'N OF FRANCHISEES & DEALERS,
http://www.aafd.org/aafds-four-goals-of-service (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
162. Id.
163. Purvin, supra note 160.
164. Don Sniegowski, Bob Purvin: "FranchiseeAssociations Are Growing But We
Should Be Seeing More", BLUE MAUMAU (July 15, 2008, 4:43 AM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/5841/bobpurvinfranchiseeassociations_aregrowing but
we should be seeingmore.
165. Id.
166. Who We Are, INr'L ASS'N OF FRANCHISEES & DEALERS, http://www.franchiseinfo.ca/about/about.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
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franchisee associations. 167 The IAFD's strategic committee includes
legal counsel to numerous franchisee associations. 168 Additionally, the
LAFD provides educational data to independent franchisee
associations. 69
The LFD also has an independent franchisee
170
directory, which reveals that the JAFD succeeded to identify only 58
franchise chains that have independent franchisee associations. 171
V.

CONCLUSION

Franchisee protection laws have two central goals: first, to remedy
the disparity of bargaining power between strong franchisors and weak
franchisees; and second, to protect franchisees against perceived
opportunism on the part of the franchisor.
However, franchisor
advocates uniformly conclude that these laws are undesirable. Their
central claim is that independent franchisee associations reduce the
inequality of bargaining power between franchisor and franchisees and,
therefore, serve as a sufficient protection against franchisor opportunism.
To date, most states have refused to adopt general franchisee protection
laws, keeping in line with the franchisor advocates' view. Similarly, at
the federal level, such laws have been rejected entirely.
This Article presents a challenge to the validity of franchisor
advocates' analysis. In most cases independent franchisee associations
are unlikely to be established by franchisees in the first place because a
franchisee's expected costs for leading the establishment of an
association exceed her expected benefits. Therefore, policymaker
reliance on independent franchisee associations as a control against
franchisor opportunism should be reassessed. Consequently, the door
should be reopened to considering the adoption of franchisee protection
laws.

167. See id.
168. Id.
169. The IAFD website has a section which includes resources for independent
franchisee associations. See, e.g., Katrina Mitchell, Why Celebrity Speakers Fail at
Franchise Conventions, INT'L Ass'N OF FRANCHISEES & DEALERS (Nov. 18, 2012,
8:31 PM), http://www.franchise-info.ca/resources/2012/11/why-celebrity-speakers-failat.html#.UcXb5j7wJgw.
170. Directory of Independent FranchiseeAssociations, INT'L ASS'N OF FRANCHISEES
& DEALERS
http://www.franchise-info.ca/about/directory-of-independent-franchiseeassociations.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
171. Id. Many small franchised networks likely also have associations, which must
account for larger estimates of the total number of associations. As of 2010, for example,
it was estimated that there were at least 250 franchisee associations in the United States.
Ten Most Powerful FranchiseAssociations, BLUE MAUMAU (July 23, 2010, 12:10 PM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/9125/ten-mostpowerful-franchiseassociations.

